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Reviews
Voltaire and the Cowboy: The Letters of Thurman Arnold. Edited,
with an Introduction, by Gene M. Gressley. Boulder: Colorado
Associated University Press, 1977. pp. xiv, 552, Price: $15.00
Who was Thurman Arnold? A flamboyant character from Laramie,
Wyoming, who first achieved national prominence in the late 1930s
when, at that time a professor at the Yale Law School, he published
his brilliant and provocative The Folklore of Capitalism. A man
equally at home in the world of action and the world of ideas, who
went on to become, successively, Franklin D. Roosevelt's man in
charge of trust-busting, a judge on a federal circuit court of appeal
and senior partner in a firm of corporation lawyers in Washington
but did not cease stirring people up by public speeches, articles in
learned journals and letters to newspapers. A true and lifelong son
of the West who was once aptly described as "a cross between
Voltaire and the cowboy, with the cowboy predominating"
(p. vix).
And how did Professor Gressley, a respected historian of the
West, come to collect and edit these many-faceted letters? Because
he was able to induce Arnold, the boy from Laramie, to give his
papers to the Archives of the University of Wyoming, which has its
seat at Laramie. Feeling that "it is in his letters that the real
Thurman Arnold comes closest to being revealed" (p. xi), he
himself undertook the task of selecting from over 17,000 of them
those that to him seemed the most revealing. To them he added a
long and perspective-giving Introduction that sheds a good deal of
light on this fascinating man.
And why did a reviewer for the volume turn up in far-away
Halifax, Nova Scotia? Because I have always wanted to know what
made Arnold tick, and hoped that this book might give me some
kind of an answer. In the troubled and depression-ridden thirties
when I was a young law teacher looking for ideas "to set all things
right" he became, with the publication of his The Symbols of
Government and The Folklore of Capitalism - both of which I
reviewed, ecstatically, for the CanadianBar Review' - one of my
gods. Although I have always been somewhat disappointed by what
1. (1936), 14 Can. B. Rev. 278; (1938), 16 Can. B. Rev. 417
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has always seemed to me to be the decline from grace of his later
career - particularly his ending up with the Washington law firm
- I have never ceased to wonder what "Arnold the man" was
really like. His own autobiography, Fair Fights and Foul (latest
edition, 1965), did not give me much help; for it was, as he himself
put it in the preface, "not greatly personal

. .

. [but] an attempt to

bring up to date the ideas expressed in my Folklore of Capitalism."
Do the letters in Voltaire and the Cowboy give me what I have been
looking for?
Not really - despite the help given me by Professor Gressley in
this bulky, carefully edited and attractively produced book. In his
Introduction of more than 90 large and quite closely printed pages
he has from time to time written passages that do indeed give me a
vivid picture of Arnold the man. As for the letters themselves (about
400 pages), he has organized them under headings that correspond
with eight significant periods in Arnold's life (each of which he has
in the introduction explored and put in its larger social context) for example, III, The Yale Law School: 1930-1936; VII, The
McCarthy Years: 1949-1955 - and he has appended to them
informative notes that always explain who Arnold's correspondent
was and also, where necessary, how the letter came to be written.
What then was my problem? First, I found the book awkward to
hold; it was not, as I had hoped, one to be browsed through in an
armchair; it has, in true scholarly fashion, to be put on a table and
studied. Second, once I was past the early, personal, letters (I,
College and Career: 1910-1918), the people to whom the letters
were written and the issues raised were so many and various that I
just became muddled. And finally, to be quite truthful, I - a
Canadian insufficiently versed in the American scene - found
myself so unfamiliar with so many of the events and ideas referred
to that I was unable to appreciate the "Arnold nuances" that any
reasonably intelligent American reader would catch at once. In a
word, Professor Gressley has done a good job and it is my fault that
I did not get from the letters what I had hoped.
John Willis
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University
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CriminalLaw. By Alan W. Mewett and Morris Manning. Toronto.
Butterworths, 1978. Pp. xlii, 577. Price: $65.00
A few years ago in the austere calm of the pages of the Journal of
the Society of Public Teachers of Law an argument briefly fluttered
concerning the utility of textbooks.' Professor William Twining
began the controversy by answering his own question: Is Your
Textbook Really Necessary? with, as I understand him (and in
reading what Professor Twining has to say I am as much impressed
by the style and dash as I am informed by the substance), a highly
qualified, "Yes, but .... " Professor T. B. Smith in a subsequent
issue of the same journal ventured to reply, "Yes, if. ...
2 One
thing I believe Professor Smith was clear about was that his own
writings satisfied all relevent tests (and I would hesitate to question
the excellence of his judgment on that issue) though he was less sure
that the rest of ours had done so.
I do not propose to enter this controversy, for I should feel (or
quickly be made to feel) like a ship's fender pressed between a
supertanker and the main wharf of Halifax Harbour. But, what I am
going to say is that the absence of any textbook on a given legal
subject is a decided and serious drawback. Certainly I found on
arriving in Canada last summer to teach criminal law that this was
so. It was not that I wanted a ready made set of lectures that I could
pass on with minimal effort to my students (I cannot, by the way,
rid myself of the English habit of referring to students as a species of
property), but that I required a ready way to orient myself so that I
could quickly pass on to what interested me. In the same way I
required a map of Halifax to tell me where to find this and that
though it would be for me to work out the best route and choose the
places that seemed most likely to repay a visit.
The various annotated Codes were of some help but in a way (and
I intend no disrespect for their editors) were not unlike a street index
without the accompanying map. Fortunately, publication of
CriminalLaw by Professor Alan Mewett and Mr. Morris Manning
was then expected "any day now", but since I know well enough
that publishers use this expression rather as hospitals use
"satisfactory" to describe a patient whose condition is entirely
unknown, I thought it prudent to contact the publishers, Messrs.
1. (1970-71), 11 J.S.P.T.L. 81
2. Authors andAuthority (1972-73), 12 J.S.P.T.L. 3
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Butterworths. Their response was exceedingly civil. They offered
what they had, the first half in page proofs, and I gratefully
accepted. These saw me through to the end of the first semester;
now that I have the remainder I am tolerably confident of my ability
to survive the second.
There is then - for judge and practitioner, for teacher and
student - a need for an ordered account of the criminal law of
Canada. If this book did no more than provide that ordered account
in passably decent prose it would be welcome and assured of
success. In my view Mewett and Manning have done much more.
They have written, and written well, a scholarly account of the
criminal law in Canada, never seeking to avoid difficulties, always
prepared to offer a rationalisation or a solution.
Of course, few books are beyond the reach of the grubby hand of
criticism. I hope mine will not be seen as carping and, in truth, I
offer the following comments more as suggestions for the authors to
consider in the preparation of the second edition than as indications
of serious shortcomings in the first.
In Chapter 1 I think the authors should have included a specific
section devoted to the scope and interpretation of the Code. In
Chapter 1 and elsewhere many observations are made on both, but
the subject seems to me so important as to require some detailed
observations at the outset. Clearly, as the authors are well aware,
the Code is not the comprehensive source of law (there are, for
example, other federal statutes), nor is it the exclusive source of law
(since s. 7(3), for example, provides an escape hatch into the
common law for certain purposes). Nevertheless, just how
comprehensive and exclusive is the Code? What is the relationship
with the common law? Whose common law? How is the Code to be
interpreted? I ask these questions because I do not think that
Canadian courts have always been aware of their importance, let
alone resolved them. Sometimes the impression I get from a
particular case is that the court thinks that the Code is no more than
a convenient restatement which was never really intended to alter
the common law. Thus it is assumed by some Canadian courts (the
example I take happens not to concern the substantive criminal law
but it does concern the Code) that there is a right of personal search
incident to arrest. Yet the Code says nothing about this whatever.
There are detailed and rigorous provisions on search of premises,
some provisions on particular powers of personal search, but not a
word on any general right to search upon arrest though some courts
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and the police evidently assume that such a power exists.
Presumably the reasoning is (and you have to guess at it) that
personal search on arrest is justified via the s. 7(3) excape hatch.
But is it? Can s. 7(3) be used to create rights of search of which the
Code says nothing?
The Code presents formidable problems of interpretation. It has
no fixed vocabulary of terms; the approach to criminal liability is far
from consistent (mischief, for instance, has a more narrowly
defined mens rea than murder); and it has been subject to the
vicissitudes of constant amendment and re-amendment. Dickson J.
properly identified the starting point when he said in Johnson v. the
Queen:
We are concerned here with a Code. We start with the Code
and not with the previous state of the law for the purposes of
inquiring whether the Code has made any change. On the plain
meaning of our [my italics] Code the facts of this case show the
commission of an indictable offence . .. .3
The injunction is obviously right but where do we go from there? If
the provision in the Code is unclear, how far is it permissible (or
necessary) to resolve the matter by other internal evidence in the
Code, or is it permissible to resort instanter to "the common law"?
To illustrate this point, and to make another, it is worth
considering recklessness in the context of the Code. When
academics use the expression "recklessness" they mean by that a
consequence subjectively foreseen though not desired by the actor.
Recklessness in this sense is discussed by the authors (p. 89) and
quite properly so. Recklessness in ordinary usage, however, can
mean different things. The trouble is that "recklessness", unlike
"intention", is not a neutral word. It is possible to say that an actor
intentionally brings about a consequence without any implication
that his conduct is good or bad, lawful or criminal. But when we say
that an actor recklessly brings about a consequence the ordinary
implication is that his conduct must be bad rather than good,
criminal rather than lawful. "Reckless" is an emotive word while
"intent" is not. "Reckless" may then be used (a) only as an index
of foresight (an actor is reckless if he foresees the risk of harm); (b)
only in the pejorative sense (an actor is reckless if his conduct
viewed objectively is highly unreasonable or unjustifiable); or (c) to
combine both notions (an actor is reckless if he foresees the risk
3. (1977), 37 C.R.N.S. 38-at 379 (S.C.C.)
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and, in the circumstances, it is highly unreasonable or unjustifiable
for him to take that risk).
How is it used in the Code? Restricting the inquiry (as in the first
place I think it must be) to the internal evidence, it is surely clear
that in s. 212(a) (ii) (murder) and s. 386(1) (mischief) "reckless" is
used only in the pejorative sense of highly unreasonable; in these
provisions the word is not used as an index of foresight because
each provision separately specifies the index of foresight. Thus for
mischief the actor must foresee that he "will probably cause the
occurrence of the event" and be reckless about that occurrence; for
murder the actor must intentionally cause bodily harm knowing that
it "is

likely to cause .

.

. death"

and be reckless about that

occurrence. Turning to the use of "reckless" in connection with
criminal negligence, the relevant provision (s. 202) does not
separately specify any index of foresight. What deduction is to be
drawn from that? And the issue is of course further complicated by
the addition of "wanton or" before "reckless" in the definition of
criminal negligence.
In their discussion of this matter in Chapter 4 the authors remind
themselves (quite rightly) that interpretation is "constrained by
what the Code says", but preface that with the (safety-valve)
observation, "it is clear that in Canada at least one is first of all"
constrained by the Code (p. 103). The italics are mine and I am
bound to ask: where do the authors plan to go second of all? What
they do, I think, is- to resort to a priori reasoning (not necessarily
wrong in itself) and conclude that "reckless" here does not require
proof of subjective foresight and that an actor is reckless where he has not foreseen the consequence but his act (or omission) is
such as to increase substantially the likelihood of the risks
materializing (p. 103).
I would, respectfully, agree with that conclusion but have reached it
by a different route. Since "reckless" appears in s. 202 without any
index of foresight it is my submission that the rational deduction on
the internal evidence provided by the Code is that foresight is not
required.
The authors then suggest that "wanton" and "reckless" are not
the same things. Since "or" is normally disjunctive this can hardly
be an improper suggestion and it enables the authors to say that
"wanton"
indicates that the accused has foreseen the risk he is creating and
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chooses to act .

.

. in spite of the risks being created by his act.

(p. 103)
If the authors are right then an indictment alleging only wanton
disregard would require proof of foresight, but an indictment
alleging only reckless disregard would require no such proof. This
would be an odd -

though not impossible -

interpretation of the

legislation. To resolve the puzzle it must, I suggest, be permissible
to have regard to the history of this provision. It made its debut in
the 1955 revision and we may look at its genesis. Stephen had
always thought that negligence should suffice to support a charge of
manslaughter provided it was of a sufficiently high degree, a matter
he was disposed to leave to the jury. The original Code was by no
means clear on the matter; the Royal Commission thought the
matter ought to be clarified and hence s. 202. Now the important
point here is that the Commission sought only to clarify the law and
not to alter it; it was their intention to provide a formula that would
encapsulate the law as it had been stated in England in cases such as
R. v. Bateman4 and R. v. Andrews 5 so that death caused by a high
(gross, criminal) degree of negligence would suffice for manslaughter. Arguably "wanton or reckless" was not the happiest expression
to make this clear but it becomes clear enough in the end. Thus the
"or" in "wanton or reckless" is no more disjunctive than the "or"
in the Yorkshire expression, "Hell, Hull or Halifax" (the Halifax
being the one in the West Riding and not Nova Scotia) to denote
places of the same (highly undesirable) class. This view is further
supported by the use of "shows" - as the authors point out, the
use of this word implies a rejection of the distinction between
advertent and inadvertent negligence, a point which has not
previously been given sufficient attention (p. 10 4 ). In one sense, by
the way, s. 202 helpfully clarifies the law. The negligence must
exist in relation to endangering life and safety. It is thus clear that
the jury must have regard not only to the greater risk of harm but
also to the risk of greater harm.
I hope the point I have made so far (always assuming it is
discernible) has not been unduly laboured. What separates me from
the authors is merely a matter of degree. They are well aware of the
Code and the interpretive problems it poses; I would want to
increase the emphasis by dealing with the implications of a codified
4. (1925), 94 L.J.K.B. 791 (CA.).
5. [1937] W.N. 69(C.A.).
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system at or about the beginning of the book. I would wish to make
it plain beyond a peradventure that answers must be found in the
first place within the four corners of the Code, and how harmony of
interpretation might be achieved; and then to explain how far it may
be permissible to consult other sources (the history of the Code, for
example), when it becomes permissible to have regard to the
common law, and what is meant by common law. "Common law"
cannot mean the common law as it is understood by English courts
since the development of all law involves choices and Canadian
courts are entitled (bound?) to make choices most suited to
Canadian needs.
Now for some smaller issues. I think that R. v. Bernard6 (referred
to at pp. 74, 78) was a questionable extension of the Meli v. The
Queen7 principle; it was not part of Bernard's "plan", or of any act
intentionally or recklessly done to the victim, to run over the
deceased. In the discussion of recklessness (p. 89, and where it is
discussed as a general concept), it is not clear whether the authors
think a person ought to be accounted reckless where he foresees a
consequence as probable or even if he foresees it as merely possible.
The authors picked up the decision of the English Court of Appeal
in R. v. Quick8 but do not discuss its possible implications on the
meaning of disease of the mind. R. v. Deakin is discussed in
connection with assault (p. 476), 9 but receives no mention in
connection with the general discussion of transferred mens rea
(p. 275), though it seems to me to suggest that in Canada the
doctrine of transferred mens rea applies only (i) where the Code
makes express provision for it (as it does in, for example, sections
212(b) and 228), or (ii) where the crime is one of basic or general
intent. The decision by the Manitoba Court of Appeal is clearly
right on (i) but questionable on (ii). Since the Code makes some
express provision for transferred mens rea, does this have any
implication in relation to offences where no express provision is
made?
The reader should not be misled into thinking that because
two-thirds of the book is devoted to general principles, specific
offences are neglected. Obviously much of what is said on general
principles concerns specific offences. Nevertheless some of the
6.
7.
8.
9.

(1961), 130 C.C.C. 165 (N.B.C.A.)
[1954] 1 All E.R. 373 (P.C.)
[1973] 3 All E.R. 347 (C.A.)
(1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (Man. C.A.).
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chapters dealing with specific offences need to be expanded. The
ten page treatment of theft, for instance, is a bit on the short side;
students and practitioners will look forward to more detailed
guidance in the second edition.
What I have had to say has been mostly by way of suggestion.
The only weaknesses of the book (and they need to be remedied) are
that the index is woefully inadequate and there is no table of
statutes. Both are tedious to prepare but essential. A dozen bright
students (with which the U of T abounds) could make a good job
both in short order.
I have said enough to make it clear that Mewett and Manning
have written a very good book and they will enjoy (if enjoy is the
right word) the privilege of producing many subsequent editions.
Anyone who wishes to study and understand the criminal law of
Canada cannot afford to be without it; if he is intimidated by the cost
he has my assurance that it is worth taking out a second mortgage on
his house to raise the purchase price.
Brian Hogan
Visiting Professor (1978-79)
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

Taking Rights Seriously. By Ronald Dworkin. London: Gerald
Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1977. Pp. xv, 293. Price: $29.50
Taking Rights Seriously makes an important contribution to
philosophic theories of law and justice. Dworkin presents a
comprehensive general theory of law which is both normative and
conceptual. It includes, among other things, theories of (1)
legislation involving questions of legitimacy and legislative justice,
(2) adjudication involving theories of controversy and jurisdiction,
and (3) compliance involving theories of deference and enforcement. Moreover, the whole theory of law is itself seen as part of a
more general theory of justice within a yet broader social and
political theory.
He develops this comprehensive theory through a methodology
which focuses on "hard cases" as crucial tests for competing
theories of law. He argues that we must acquire a clear view of the
underlying principles and intentions of our laws in order to know
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how to resolve the hard cases where the law appears to be vague or
contradictory. In fact, it is the very existence of such hard cases
which he takes to be decisive in arguing against the leading
alternative theory of law, namely legal positivism.
Dworkin's own theory, once developed, is then applied to a
series of socially significant contemporary legal problems. Through
appeal to pressing issues, he makes explicit some practical
implications of the principles he propounds. While this combination
of theory and application increases interest and understanding, it is
regrettably done with a rather awkward shift in style and
perspective. Unfortunately, the book still reads rather like the series
of articles it was originally written to be - the theoretical ones
coming from law journals, and the practical ones from a more
popular forum, The New York Review of Books.
Dworkin's main argument turns on the fundamental claim that
our legal structures embody and reflect an underlying theory of
justice which is more basic than any actual institutions. He rejects
the theory of legal positivism, by considering a particular
formulation of it by H.A. Hart, and by arguing more generally that
no amendments to this version can be adequate. He characterizes
legal positivism as having at least these essential features: (1) a
belief that the law of the community is a finite set of rules for
determining punishable behavior; (2) a presumption that there is a
finite decision procedure for determining if a rule is a law by
investigating its origins; and (3) an analysis of legal obligation that
says that these established laws constitute a citizen's legal
obligations.
Dworkin rejects this widely accepted analysis of the concepts of
law and legal obligation because of its inadequacy in accounting for
the specific kinds of arguments and appeals which lawyers and
scholars must use in resolving those tricky disputed cases of legal
rights and obligations. In hard cases, the outcome cannot be settled
by examining statutes. Appeal is made to principles and not just to
documented legislation. The positivist conception denies this
possibility, for it can neither explain nor even describe the role of
extra-legal standards in interpreting the concepts of law, legal
obligation, and legal right, and hence it is an inadequate theory of
law.
Similarly, Dworkin argues that utilitarian interpretations of these
concepts of law and legal right and obligation are also unacceptable.
Utilitarian conceptions would have these hard cases resolved by
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appeals to policies, i.e. collective goals, but they cannot account for
decisions in favour of individual rights in the face of some
competing collective goal. Yet surely the law must protect
individual rights at times when they conflict with some collective
goal. In contrast, Dworkin's theory gives highest priority to
arguments from principle which protect an individual's fundamental
rights even in the face of widely held collective goals. The
alternative he proposes is a rights-based theory which affirms that
an individual can have rights against the state which are prior to any
rights or obligations created by explicit legislation. This theory
allows that individuals have rights that may be relevant in
adjudication other than those explicitly cited in legislation, a
possibility which neither legal positivism nor utilitarianism can
account for. In particular, Dworkin argues that individuals have a
right to equality which he identifies as a right to equal concern and
respect.
The result of acknowledging the fundamental importance of a
commitment to this natural right is quite dramatic for jurisprudence.
It implies that individuals can have rights to specific judicial
decisions even if there is no explicit law or precedent determining
that decision. Judicial decisions must reflect such principles as well
as existing legislation; where the latter is inadequate, judges should
recognize that someone may, nonetheless, have a right to win. Such
decisions are required when supported by compelling arguments of
principle which establish the existence of the relevant right.
Utilitarian concerns for collective goals being reflected in policy
are appropriate to consider in drafting legislation, but even here,
Dworkin thinks there is a limit on the range of legitimate legislation.
It too must reflect the individual's basic right to concern and
respect, and any legislation aimed at policy should ensure that the
goals sought do not violate this fundamental right.
An individual's right to equal concern and respect is the
underlying principle which directs judges in hard cases and restricts
legislatures in all cases. Hence, it's own legitimacy must be
established. In order to do this, Dworkin must build a general theory
of justice that turns on this right at its most basic level. For this
purpose, he appeals to the theory of justice developed by John
Rawls in A Theory ofJustice. '
Dworkin shares Rawls' view that justice is characterized by the
1. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)
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two principles which require (1) that every person is entitled to the
largest liberty compatible with a like liberty for all, and (2) that
inequalities be permitted only if they are in the interest of the
worst-off members of society. But Dworkin wants to go further than
Rawls and explain why these principles do in fact capture the
concept of justice. He notes that Rawls' argument is elliptical and
that the force of the social contract which he appeals to is not made
explicit. In attempting to spell out its role, Dworkin sees it as an
intermediate stage of a yet deeper political theory underlying the
two principles cited, and it is the deeper theory to which Dworkin
appeals.
He argues that the deep theory of political morality on which
Rawls' theory rests must be deontological rather than teleological. It
is one in which an individual has rights so fundamental that it is
unjustified to fail to provide whatever service they specify even if
such services run contrary to any other goals that the specific
political theory may establish. The social contract which Rawls
invokes in his argument is significant because it grants everyone a
veto; it makes individual rights more powerful than any social goal
or duty might be. But the individual rights of the deep theory which
Dworkin perceives are abstract and not specific. The fundamental
right is not to liberty nor to equality with respect to distributive
justice. Rather it is the very abstract right "to equal concern and
respect in the design and administration of the political institutions
that govern them" (p. 180). This right is a precondition to the
original position Rawls employs: it is theoretically prior even to
Rawls' social contract and to his two principles of justice, i.e. the
latter make sense only if persons have such a right. It serves as the
formulation and guiding principle for all dilemmas of justice, since
the right to equal concern and respect is the foundation not only of
our theory of justice but also of a proper theory of law; it is the basis
of our institutions of legal justice.
The normative case for his position is the abstract argument that
ultimately legal authority rests on a morally correct theory of
justice. That theory must have this fundamental right as its central
principle, and hence everything built on top of it, including our
specific legal institutions and statutes, must preserve and reflect this
right in order to maintain their authority.
The argument is complicated, though, by his attempt also to
provide a descriptive analysis of the role of this commitment to
rights in practice. For this task, he uses his repeated appeal to the
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resolution of hard cases by the courts. He tells us that judges can
decide hard cases by appeal to principles, ultimately resting on
rights, but cannot rely on policy or goal-based decisions if they run
counter to individual rights. But what grounds does he have for
believing that judges are justified in deciding according to principle
rather than law or precedent? One important ground he relies on
repeatedly is that the U.S. Constitution requires it. That is fine for
American jurisprudents, but it is unclear how helpful it is for those
of us seeking either a general theory of law or a specific set of
jurisprudence beliefs applicable also in countries like Canada where
there is no constitution guaranteeing individual rights. The law does
not itself require appeal to individual rights, yet Dworkin still thinks
rights play a crucial role. For us, there is nothing to fall back on
other than the normative arguments. Since he argues that citizens
must have rights against the state, appeal to the constitution is really
just a means of appealing to these morally entrenched rights.
Without such a constitution, one must get by without these
intermediary steps. By frequently switching ground between
normative and descriptive analyses of the role of individual rights in
the law, he complicates his argument unnecessarily. It would be
preferable to separate the two kinds of argument entirely.
It should be noted that Dworkin does not seem to share an
increasingly widespread concern that the courts frequently overstep
their authority. Many jurisprudents are becoming appalled by the
increasing tendency of judges, primarily American ones, not just to
rule on the law, but also to set moral norms, specific policy
proposals, and even administrative decisions (specifying details of
"adequate institutional care", for instance). Dworkin allows judges
whatever authority is necessary to protect the fundamental right of
each citizen to equal concern and respect. He does not seem to think
that the use of this authority will involve undue meddling in matters
more properly dealt with in the legislature. He does not specify any
limits to be set on the increasing tendency of judges to make moral
decisions, though presumably the limit of that decision-making
power rests on the limit of the right to equality, since he does not
authorize judges to make any further moral decisions. But the right
itself is a vague one which leaves room for much disagreement
about its actual scope. His attempt to resolve it by leaving policy
matters to the legislatures is problematic because of the difficulty in
separating issues of individual rights and collective goals, especially
given the tendency of rights to conflict with other rights.
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When Dworkin does get down to specific hard issues, as he does
in the latter half of the book, he is at his most engaging. He deals
with civil disobedience, reverse discrimination, homosexuality,
censorship of pornography, and liberty. All of these essays were
written for general audiences and focus on important contemporary
issues in order to develop further his notion of a theory of justice
resting on a right to equality.
For instance, in the chapter on reverse discrimination he
considers the DeFunis case, 2 an affirmative action case involving
the use of race as a criterion for admission to law school; his task
there is to distinguish the relevant notion of equality which must be
invoked in order to explain why affirmative action cases may be
legitimate and yet cases of ordinary discrimination, like the Sweatt
case, 3 are not legitimate. Here, as elsewhere, Dworkin argues that
equality is the key right, but he stresses that we must be careful that
we use the relevant concept of equality. People are not entitled to
equal treatment in all matters whereby all receive equivalent
benefits, burdens and opportunities; rather they have a right to
treatment as an equal which guarantees equal concern and respect.
The fact that some people are admitted to law school does not
ensure that everyone else who seeks admission should be granted it.
Criteria of evaluation are appropriate for discriminating amongst
applicants so long as the interests of all are considered fairly and
sympathetically. Acceptable criteria to employ can be determined
by considering equally the interests of all affected. This will mean
that it is legitimate for a community to use intelligence as a criterion
for admission if it has reason to believe this policy reflects its
general interests. Hence, it may also use race when it serves
legitimate broad interests.

But here Dworkin runs into a complication. If race is allowed in
the DeFunis case to promote the interests of a disadvantaged
minority, why not also in the Sweatt case where a Texan Law school
argued that majority prejudice indicated more interests would be
served by a policy of excluding blacks? This difficulty arises from a
too simple conception of utilitarianism. Dworkin argues that this
simple notion of measuring preferences, though it counts everyone's
preferences equally, is actually counter-equalitarian, since it really
allows multiple votes for the interests of particular persons
2. DeFunis v. Odegaard(1974), 94 S. Ct. 1704
3. Sweatt v. Painter(1949), 70 S. Ct. 848
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whenever people care about other people's interests. To handle this
problem Dworkin introduces a distinction between personal and
external preferences, where a personal preference is for one's own
enjoyment of goods and opportunities and an external preference
involves the assignment of goods and opportunities to others. The
argument, then, is that external preferences allow multiple
preferences for how a particularly favoured or disliked individual is
to be treated and this preference scheme is not egalitarian. It allows
the interests of one person to be given much more weight than the
interests of another. Policies dependent on external preferences
necessarily violate the individual's right to treatment as an equal.
In contrast, the affirmative action policies need not be defended
on the grounds of external preferences. They are supported by ideal
arguments which justify a policy in pursuit of a social ideal of a
more equal society. Decisions made in accordance with a policy
shaped by such ideal grounds, a policy intended to result in a society
closer to an ideal society, still can respect each individual's right to
equal concern and respect. Some individuals will be disappointed,
as would be the case whatever selection criteria are employed, but
all are treated as equals, and the disappointment of any is a genuine
subject of concern. Therefore, reverse discrimination can be
relevantly different from ordinary discrimination and may, under
certain conditions, be justifiable even though other forms of
discrimination are illegal.
I find Dworkin's analysis in this and the other cases of social
problems to be insightful and powerful. He uniformly defends a
"liberal" position but not as a reflex reaction. Rather his political
and social views evolve from a well-developed moral perspective in
which the criteria for deciding public policy are carefully ordered.
First, he recognizes one fundamental right of all persons, namely
the right to equal concern and respect relative to everyone else.
With that in mind, the government can form policies and legislation
reflecting its varying interests, all to be enforced by a reliable
judicial institution. The only constraint on laws and policies adopted
is that they not violate anyone's basic right to equality. If they
should do so, either deliberately or inadvertently, the responsibility
falls to the judiciary to correct that overextension of power.
Otherwise courts must proceed as the legislature directs. Each has a
rightful authority and they jointly guide citizens in their legal
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obligations. But all levels of legislative and judicial institutions
must ensure that individual rights are indeed taken seriously.
Susan Sherwin
Department of Philosophy
Dalhousie University

